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Abstract 
Sustainable  growth strategies  depend criticaly  on the role  of the state in  diferent societies, and the 
incentive structures associated  with alternative institutional arangements. In  particular, in  multi-level 
countries, incentive structure mater even more, as elements of “game play” between diferent levels of 
government  becomes  possible. Under these circumstances,  organizational structures borowed from 
advanced countries may not function as expected and could generate deleterious incentives. This paper 
focuses on the institutions and governance issues as preconditions for sustainable growth. 
The paper argues that the key to growth-compatible institutions is information. This is clear on the 
spending side, to ensures that funds are used eficiently for the purposes intended. A requirement is for 
budgeting and reporting standards that are common across jurisdictions at the same level and between 
levels of government, together with appropiate tracking of cash. 
On the revenue side, efective subnational control  over a revenue  base and an arms length 
administration are critical for accountability.  This can  be achieved  with rate seting authority at lower 
levels, together with components of administration at higher levels. Of course, an appropriately designed 
tax policy agenda does much to foster appropriate structural reforms that generate growth. Such would 
be the case  with say a carbon tax,  with appropriate responsibilities at  diferent levels  of  government 
—although many of the associated issues are beyond the scope of the curent paper. 
Finaly,  while  both  policies and institutions  need to  be synchronized, the  political economy  of 
reforms requires a careful analysis of gainers and losers, and appropriate measures for inclusion, especialy 
for the poor. While the paper focuses on examples from Latin America, there is much to be learnt from the 
successful experiences of emerging countries from other parts of the world, especialy China. 
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I. Introduction 
Sustainable and inclusive  growth in  multi-level countries  depends  on creating the right incentive 
structures for  public and  private investments, and supporting  public service  delivery at each level  of 
government.  Many  of the  organizations are the same across the  world, and constitute  budgetary and 
revenue agency functions encompassing the sources and  uses  of funds.  However, the context  maters, 
and the  wider set  of incentives facing  oficials and  politicians  often result in  diferent institutional 
arangements (North, 1990). 
This  paper focuses  on the incentives facing  politicians and  oficials to  use  public resources 
eficiently  —both their  own and from  donor agencies— as  wel as those  provided  by  higher levels  of 
government in the case of sub-national entities. As the recent crisis in Europe has shown, weaknesses in 
institutions and information flows afect the incentives facing subnational governments and associated 
central and subnational entities.  This  has resulted in  unsustainable and  unproductive investments, 
leading to a colapse in the  overal  macroeconomic framework in countries from Ireland to  Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and  Greece; and indeed similar influences  were at  play in the  Latin  American and  Asian 
crises in the 1990s. The focus had become to atract funds from higher levels, or capital markets, to the 
detriment of accountability to the relevant electorates, or efectiveness of provision.  
Public financial  management (PFM), somewhat  narowly  defined, in terms  of  processes and 
organizations, including  budget  preparation and execution, audit, accounting and reporting,  was 
recognized  by international agencies as  being relevant for  decentralized  operations (Ter-Minassian 
1997).  However, the  more recent literature  on the  political economy  of  multi-level governance (see 
Ahmad and  Brosio,  2006)  places the  design  of institutions and associated flow  of information at the 
heart the structure of incentives that underpin the public policy debate. 
In this  paper,  we recast the  old  PFM  discussion into a  broader  policy context  of  determining 
questions such as “Who  does  what to  generate sustainable  growth? How these activities are financed? 
What is the balance between taxation and vrious instruments to spread financing costs over a reasonable 
period, and the  measures to  mitigate risks  of  default? Where  does the  money flow?  And  what are the 
efects and outcomes of the spending? The wider institutional arangements governing these questions 
and issues become the focus of the policy choices. The asymmetric flow of information poses problems, 
and afects the incentives for central or local oficials to play games with other levels or donors, or to 
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misappropriate resources.  The  design and incentive structures  have immediate implications for the 
sustainability of the growth process. 
The context  maters, and  nominaly similar  organizational structures (see  North  1990)  may 
generate very diferent results or outcomes in diferent countries. We focus in this paper on the need for 
tighter standards on the flow and availability of information on the sources and uses of funds. Some of 
the associated institutional requirements are also discussed. However, it is increasingly recognized that 
the  design and financing  of  public  policy are  very closely interrelated and it is a  mistake to treat the 
issues completely separately (Ahmad and Best, 2012). 
In this  paper  we focus  on the  Latin  American context,  but  draw references to  other regions, 
particularly  East  Asia,  where there is a similar focus  on  growth together  with  beter  governance.  The 
extensive Chinese institutional reforms underpinning growth and structural change are of particular interest. 
In Section I we set the stage for sustainable growth, examining the global need for investment, given 
limited public resources. The availability of resources in certain parts of the world, e.g., the sovereign 
wealth funds, seeking assured returns, suggests the  need for intermediation including  by long-term 
instruments, as emphasized  by the  G30 report, together  with risk  mitigation, e.g.,  by multilateral 
agencies.  However, to the extent that  national  governments are involved, e.g., through  public  private 
partnerships, this also puts a premium on the recognition of public liabilities in the medium-to-long term, 
and need for efective tax policies. Throughout, the nexus between policy and institutional arangements 
remains critical. 
In Section II we examine issues related to accountability at diferent levels of government. These 
are inexorably linked to the  policy  decisions  of  who  does  what.  Again,  both  policies and institutional 
arangements are intertwined.  
Section IV relates to the second ingredient of incentives and accountability —linked to whether or not 
sub-national entities  have access to  own-source revenues.  This  makes it easier to link responsibilities to 
outcomes, and the presence of own-source revenues facilitates the implementation of hard budget constraints. 
Incentive issues are also associated  with the eficient  design  of tax  policies and associated 
administrations. The development of wide-base and interlinked taxes, particularly the income taxes and the 
VAT provides a potential to finance critical spending on the social sectors that is critical for growth, as wel 
as  opetations and  maintenance for investment.  This also  highlights the  need for cross-jurisdictional tax 
administrations, particularly at the central  or federal levels.  Split tax  bases could  be addressed  by 
complicated and overlapping tax administrations. There may also be a possibility for the establishment of 
independent revenue agencies, which could service the central and intermediate tiers of government on an 
agency model (like central banks). The political acceptability of this option may need to be explored, and 
considerable work is needed in this regard, especialy in Latin America, but also in Asia. For more typical 
local tax assignments, the administrative issues are less problematic. These could be seen as a continuum 
linked to capacities.  Diferent administrative functions could  be tailored for specific contexts with 
possibilities of asymmetric arangements, especialy for large metropolitan areas. 
In Section V we focus on selected issues relating to the management of the spending process at 
each level  of  government.  The  key issue  governing accountability is the timely, standardized and 
consistent flow  of information  on  who spends  what and the results  of the  process.  We focus  on 
minimizing the incentives to “play  games” in  multi-level countries and common  markets/curency 
unions. There are benefits from the use of the ful GFS2001 framework, as wel as an eficient folowing 
of the cash. We also address the special case of “kicking the can down the road,” now being seen with 
public-private-partnerships, including in the  most advanced countries, and  measures to  minimize the 
build-up of public liabilities. Section VI examines transfer design. Earmarked and gap-filing transfers 
can completely  ofset the  positive incentive efects  of  own-source revenues and efficient expenditure 
management institutions. We make the case for equalization transfer systems, almost completely absent 
from Latin America, and apart from China, not extensively used in Asia. We also put in context the case 
of performance-based transfers, which are increasingly popular with donors and international agencies. 
As  with  other  popular  measures, the  preconditions for  making these  measures  work efectively are 
poorly understood. 
ECLAC – Macroeconomics of Development Series N° 139 Generating inclusive and sustainable growth… 
9 
I. Sustainable growth: an enabling  
policy framework 
Sustainable  growth in  developing countries requires significant resources to  meet infrastructure  gaps, 
and equaly for building human capital, providing productive employment opportunities, and mitigating 
risks facing  households.  These are  not competing  objectives,  but rather reflect complementarities for 
achieving high quality and sustainable growth.  
It is  unlikely that tax revenues in the short to  medium term  wil  be suficient to cover the 
magnitude  of investment  needed, and there is a  good case to  be  made for  public  borowing for 
investment  —to facilitate  private sector investment.  Given excess savings in some  parts  of the  world, 
and considerable investment  needs elsewhere  with relatively  high social and economic rates  of return, 
risk mitigating intermediation is likely to be increasingly important. Additionaly, sound macroeconomic 
policies are essential in providing an enabling environment, conducive to sustainable growth. 
While the recent  G30 report corectly  placed emphasis  on the  private sector, longer  maturity 
investments are unlikely to take place without significant risk mitigation. This may involve both national 
governments and an increasing role for cross-border risk  mitigation  by existing  multilateral agencies 
(such as  CAF in  Latin  America)  or a  new  BRIC  Bank representing regions  with excess investible 
resources in search  of assured returns.  While the  G30 report  downplays the role  of the  public sector, 
given the need for fiscal consolidation in many parts of the world, the suggested solution for reliance on 
public  private  partnerships  does  not  provide a  mechanism to avoid  domestic resource  mobilization. 
Indeed, the  disincentives involved in  PPPs  without clear  delineation  of responsibilities  have  been the 
cause for  many  of the curent  dificulties faced in  diferent  parts  of the  world, as the can  gets  kicked 
down the road. 
As we discuss below in Section II, steps are being taken globaly to recognize the public in PPPs, 
and tighter accounting rules are being proposed to prevent the can being kicked down the road. The key 
issue relates to the time  horizon  over  which the liabilities are recognized.  This  provides a time frame 
within  which  domestic resource  mobilization in specific countries  must  be cast. China  presents a  very 
interesting case  of the interlinkages  between structural change and tax reforms; the transformation 
initiated in the late 1970s had to be butressed by major tax reforms in the early 1990s. This provided the 
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basis for the sustained  growth  over the folowing two  decades. And now, tax reforms are forming the 
basis for the subsequent structural change over the coming decade (see Ahmad and Stern, forthcoming). 
Tax revenues should be related to a clearly defined role for the state, including provision of public 
services (for general government), as wel as public responsibilities for investment and infrastructure—
within a  medium-term framework.  As  described in  Ahmad and  Stern (1991), the structure  of taxes 
should reflect considerations  of  productive eficiency,  distributional considerations, as  wel as 
administrative feasibility. In  principle, combinations  of tax instruments could  be  used to  meet 
distributional considerations (e.g., a single rate VAT could be used in conjunction with selective excises 
to generate overal progressivity in the indirect tax system) and the concern for the poorest could be met 
through targeted transfers.  As  described in  Ahmad,  Best and  Pöschl (2012), “holes” in the tax system 
designed to meet distributional concerns, or to encourage specific industries, eventualy degenerate into 
shelters for “cheating”, and often fail to generate revenues or meet the stated objectives as wel. 
Tax instruments can also afect  demand and supply responses to reduce carbon emissions  or 
consumption of bads, and provide financing for compensatory measures if needed. This would be a key 
element  of a  desirable  overal tax structure, reflecting  government  preferences in  multilevel 
administrations. 
The key role of tax policy in supporting investment and structural change lies in the creation of a 
level playing field —as opposed to incentives and “holes”. Further, access to own-source revenues at the 
subnational level is essential to provide incentives for responsibility and eficiency. Overal, the level of 
tax revenues has to be commensurate with the buildup of reserves to meet curent and future liabilities in 
a sustainable  manner. Indeed, the extent to  which the  public sector can  gear additional resources for 
investment  depends  on the feasible revenue-envelope in the  medium-term.  National and subnational 
fiscal rules need to be devised accordingly (Ter-Minassian, forthcoming). 
In the sections to folow, we examine the issues of which level of government should do which 
function to enhance  growth  prospects. In each case, the  ways in  which the spending is financed 
influences the efectiveness of the spending, and incentives for accountability. 
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II. Spending and accountability 
It is critical for public spending to be clearly defined, accountable and linked to financing and build up 
of liabilities. Many large-scale investment projects that facilitate the operation of the private sector are in 
the  domain  of the central  government,  or even at the supranational level (in the  EU  with structural 
policies; or the CAF financing cross-border infrastructure in Latin America). 
Trends towards  decentralization are evident in  both  OECD and  developing countries.  But 
evidence  on the supposed links  between the  decentralization  process and the  generation  of  growth 
remain tenuous at  best (Ahmad,  Brosio and  Tanzi,  2008).  This  puts  much  greater emphasis  on the 
incentive compatible  design  of  decentralization  process in  order to achieve the  growth  potential that 
undoubtedly exists. 
Countries decentralize for many reasons, and often the political dimensions dominate the purely 
technocratic,  normative assignments.  This  often  has to  do  more  with satisfying  disparate  groups and 
keeping the country together than arguments related to eficiency in the provision of public services as 
wel as to engender sustainable  growth.1 However,  whatever the  motivation  governing the  degree and 
sequencing of decentralization, public policy has to be concerned with overal welfare, especialy that of 
the  marginalized and  poorer sections  of society, the efectiveness  with  which  public services are 
delivered, and the scope for sustainable growth. This paper takes a “political economy” perspective in 
relation to the institutions needed for the efective provision of public services at the subnational level, 
and  particularly the responsibility for investment  needs,  where the  benefits and costs  may  be spread 
across jurisdictions as wel as over time (hence spanning the tenure of most sub-national governments). 
A useful typology of spending responsibilities and how diferent countries approach the issues is 
given in diagram 1 that addresses the subsidiarity  principle.  This states that assignments should  be 
devolved to the lowest level capable of efectively providing them. This is a general principle of the EU 
legal framework, constraining the supranational level from legislation to areas  where action at the 
national, regional or local levels is insuficient.2 The concept has both legal and political ramifications. 
                            
1 Despite the expectation, the linkages between decentralization and growth are somewhat tenuous, and are surveyed in Ahmad 
and Brosio (2009). 
2  See htp:/eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf. 
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The focus is on scale as wel as efects, including externalities, on other jurisdictions, and this has given 
rise to actionable cases where there is a legal connotation, as in the EU.3 In political terms, the concept 
of subsidiarity is  often taken  beyond the  multi-level  government connotation to also include the 
boundaries between the private sector and the role of the state (at any level).The presumption, especialy 
be conservative commentators in the  US, is that as far as  possible the  private sector should  be 
encouraged to provide public services, as this is expected to be more eficient than public provision. 
Diagram 1 shows the  difering trends regarding the centralization/  decentralization  debate in 
diferent countries  or regions.  The arguments for  decentralization  of functions are  based largely  on 
accountability and efective provision, given the subsidiarity principles. But it is not enough to legislate 
the assignments; the lower levels have to have the capabilities as wel as the incentives to provide the 
services.  Both these are linked closely to the financing issue, as  wel as incentives for efective 
provision. Thus, arguments that local governments lack “capacity” are not strictly binding if they have 
the financial resources to hire skiled workers. 
 
DIAGRAM 1 
MODIFIED SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLES 
 
Source: Adapted from Daflon, in Ahmad and Brosio, Handbook of Fiscal Federalism. 
 
An important  hypothesis  governing accountability comes through the electoral  process  when 
voters are able to assess the performance of their “elected” rulers in relation to the standards obtaining in 
neighboring jurisdictions.4 Again, the incentives are critical, and voters are more likely to be responsive, 
if at the margin, local governments rely on own-source revenues, over which they control rates or bases 
(see Ambrosiano and Bordignon 2006 for a discussion of the general issues, and Gadenne 2012 for an 
interesting assessment based on the case of Rio da Janiero). 
Ofseting the  decentralization trends are concern that limit subsidiarity  —mainly externalities 
such as spilovers (including with environmental considerations)— congestion and economies of scale. 
Moreover, decentralization especialy of resource bases could exacerbate inequalities across regions and 
also limit the extent of interpersonal redistribution that might be feasible. In al cases, there is a role for 
                            
3 An interesting example is the European Court of Justice’s rejection of a case brought by the German Government against an EU 
Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (Case C-233/94).  
4 See Salmon (1987, 2006), Besley and Case (1995). A recent extension by Salmon posits that cross-country comparisons may be even 
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the  Federal,  Central  or  Supranational agencies to coordinate and  harmonize essential  policies. In the 
United  States and some  other federations, the  maintenance  of a  unified economic space  has  been 
facilitated through a “commerce clause.” In the EU, a common economic space is ensured through the 
common external tarif and  harmonization  of the country-level  VATs (see the  EU  Sixth  Directive) to 
minimize harmful competition. Thus, a combination of legal and regulatory frameworks is essential to 
ensure equality  of treatment and  opportunity.  Again, for this to  work eficiently, ful information is 
needed on who spends what, and the buildup of assets and liabilities, and as the recent EU experience 
ilustrates, inadequate atention to the standardized flow  of information could jeopardize a common 
economic space. 
Developing countries have tended to take either a gradual approach to decentralization —focusing 
on capacities and relying  heavily  on  overlapping functional responsibilities (especialy in  Latin 
America— such as in  Bolivia and  Peru).5 While this  may  prevent “wasteful spending”, it  does  not 
guarantee that the local  governments  wil take responsibility for functions  or sub-functions, such as 
primary education.  This is  because they are  not responsible for the ful function, and for important 
economic components (such as  wages  or ful  operations and  maintenance).  Especialy in the face  of 
weak information systems (Brazil is an exception in Latin America and Mexico is the other end of the 
spectrum),6 the prospect of holding local governments responsible for any public function is tenuous at 
best —limiting the role that yardstick competition may play to improve spending outcomes. 
At the other extreme, some countries (especialy in Asia Indonesia a decade ago, and Pakistan in 
2010) have adopted a “big-bang” approach, with a rapid devolution of functions. In the Indonesian case, 
this  was from the center to the third tier  —or  districts— largely to  prevent adding to centrifugal 
pressures that had been present in a large and diverse country. While the devolution was accompanied by 
a new revenue-sharing, the incentive structures were distorted by the design of transfers that encouraged 
the creation of new jurisdictions more than the efective provision of public services. Discontent with the 
level of public service provision has led to the gradual devolution of own-source revenues (through the 
property tax), as wel as a new set of service delivery norms. 
While simple  norms can  work to  galvanize local  opinion  by  providing standards to judge local 
government performance, these have to be accompanied by transfer design that do not distort incentives, 
as  wel as  much freer flow  of information  on service  delivery spending and  outcomes in relevant 
neighboring jurisdictions. In the Indonesian case, there is considerable work to be done to coordinate and 
standardize information generated at the local level, and by the Ministries of Home Afairs and Finance 
(none  of these sources agree  on the  details  of local spending).  Moreover,  very  detailed  norms (that 
resemble  GOSPLAN)  may actualy  be  unimplementable  given the  very limited information flows that 
are available at the present time. 
In  Pakistan, the  Musharaf  devolution at around the same time as Indonesia  was also to the 
districts, but unlike Indonesia, neither functions nor financing was made clear. This was more a way of 
avoiding the provinces, which were also centers of civilian political power. This devolution was reversed 
with the return to  democratic rule in  2008, and a  new constitutional amendment (18th  Amendment) 
devolved ful functions to provinces in 2010. However, inadequate atention was paid to either financing 
or implementation capacities and many of the functions appear to have become unfunded mandates with 
a continuing  deterioration in the standards  of  public service  delivery and  outcomes.  At the 
macroeconomic level, the failure of national tax reforms has led the federal government to borow from 
the banking system, efectively crowding out of investment and the private sector. This has led to a build 
up  of  general  government liabilities with  no financing for any level  of  government and a fal in the 
growth potential to a very low level that leads to a stagnation of real income levels. 
In the Chinese case local investment opportunities together with the responsibility system led to a 
growth stimulus.  This  was sustained  by a  major tax reform in  1994,  predicated  on creating a  State 
Administration  of  Taxation, and the implementation  of central and shared taxes,  principaly the  VAT. 
                            
5 See Ahmad and García-Escribano (2011). 
6 Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, IMF, FAD 2007, and Ahmad et al. 
ECLAC – Macroeconomics of Development Series N° 139 Generating inclusive and sustainable growth… 
14 
This  has led to an accumulation  of reserves for investment. Additional tax reforms are  now needed in 
order to  direct investment and consumption, and to  generate  greater local accountability (Ahmad and 
Stern, forthcoming). 
As the diverse examples above show, there are no perfect solutions to the issue of accountability 
and ensuring improved service  delivery  or investment enhancement. It is  however clear that critical 
ingredients in  geting  beter  outcomes,  whether in “deconcentrated setings,”  or in fuly  decentralized 
environments, are to generate “standardized information on who spends what and what are the outcomes 
in terms of spending as wel as resulting assets and liabilities. 
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IV. Subnational revenue assignments, management 
and accountability 
The links between policy and management and incentive structures is clearly ilustrated in the case of 
national and subnational revenues.  Own-source revenues at the  margin are recognized as critical in 
establishing incentives for subnational  governments to effectively  provide services and  manage 
spending efficiently (Ambrosiano and  Bordignon.  2006).  Own-source revenues are also critical in 
establishing  hard-budget constraints, as  without  own-source revenues the ability to repay  debt 
incurred becomes questionable. 
As  described in  Ahmad and  Brosio (2009a),  Latin  American countries  generaly  do  not  have 
adequate  own-source revenues at the regional  or intermediate level.  Brazil’s sub-national  VAT is an 
exception, however, it causes distortions, problems with trade facilitation and encourages “cheating.” In 
most countries the centralizing efect of the VAT is apparent, and revenue-shares do not constitute own-
source revenues in a strict sense, and  operate like transfers as local  governments  do  not  have control 
over rate structures  or the  base  of the tax (see table  1, columns  1a and  1b).  The revenue-shares are, 
however, critical in  meeting the  vertical imbalances; and alternatives  need to  be sought that  do  not 
involve the complexity of both the policy framework as wel as dificulties with administration. Indeed, 
the two are clearly linked. 
Spliting the revenue base for the major taxes such as the ISR (Income taxes) and VAT in Mexico, 
with firms  under  2  milion pesos  being administered  by the states  under the smal taxpayer (REPECOS) 
regime, creates an additional loophole that further adds to the incentives to informality and cheating in 
Mexico,7 leading to a  non-oil tax/GDP ratio  of around  10%.  States  have litle incentive or capability  of 
auditing REPECOS companies, most of which are bunched at the botom end, suggesting that they pay just 
enough to satisfy the states and to keep the Federal SAT of their backs (Ahmad, Best and Pöschl, 2013).  
Consolidating the ISR as well as the VAT, and creating a new business tax at the local level may 
be a possible solution. For the States, in principle, a piggy-back or surcharge on the income tax, and a 
                            
7 It is estimated that evasion from the REPECOS is around 95% (SAT, 2011); and this creates additional incentives for firms to hide 
their transactions. 
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Canadian-style  dual  VAT, could  both  provide them  with  own-source revenues  without the  need to 
establish a separate tax administration (see columns  2a and  2b in table  1).  One could think  of a 
continuum  of tax  policy/administration functions that could  be  gradualy  devolved to subnational 
governments, depending on the policy framework and capacity to administer (see table 1). 
There is also an important political economy element in the choices, as subnational governments 
may not trust a national or federal revenue administration, which are becoming more common in Latin 
America (see table 2). The political economy difficulties may be reduced if the revenue administrations 
are converted into Independent  boards, like  Central  Banks,  but  with representation from states and 
subnational  governments  on the  Boards.  This,  however, also faces formidable  political economy 
constraints in specific countries and  would  have to  be  very carefuly  discussed  with  various levels  of 
government in order to achieve a buy-in. 
The situation is  beter at the  municipal level,  where the  property tax is corectly recognized as 
being important in  many countries  —although it is  not strictly a local tax in  many  others (with the 
regions/states  having an important role in countries like  Mexico and Bolivia in seting rates and  other 
elements of the administration matrix— see table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 
TYPOLOGY FOR LOCAL TAXATION AND POLICY 
Key factors Central tax 
1a 1b  2a 2b  3a 3b 
Shared taxes  Own-revenue/Surcharge  Local tax 
CA JA  JA CA 
 
JA LA 
Rate/base CG CG CG  LG LG LG LG 
Revenue CG CG/LG CG/LG  LG LG  LG LG 
          
ADMINISTRATION          
Registration CG CG CG  CG CG  LG LG 
Valuation CG CG CG  CG CG  LG LG 
Assessment CG CG CG  CG CG  LG LG 
Bil delivery CG CG CG/LG  CG/LG CG  LG LG 
Colection CG CG CG  CG CG  LG LG 
Enforcement CG CG CG  CG CG  LG LG 
Services CG CG CG/LG  CG/LG CG  LG LG 
         Local autonomy 
          
 Central control        
Source: Ahmad (forthcoming). 
Note: CA: central administration, JA: joint administration, LA: local administration. 
 
TABLE 2 
PRACTICES CONCERNING INDEPENDENT REVENUE AUTHORITIES 



































ECLAC – Macroeconomics of Development Series N° 139 Generating inclusive and sustainable growth… 
17 
Table 2 (concluded) 













































































Public service Outside Outside Outside Outside Outside Public service 
rules (limited 
autonomy) 
HR autonomy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Limited 


























































Source: Ahmad (forthcoming). 
 
From the  perspective  of local accountability and responsibility,  having  own-source revenues is 
critical. As we have seen above, the capacity constraints need not be binding, and international agencies 
like CEPAL/IADB could assist with the work towards making revenue agencies truly independent, and 
encouraging  piggy-backed  options at the states/departmental levels; and  developing  business and 
property taxes at the local level, again using the principles of modern tax administration relying on self 
assessment, accurate flow  of information  on transactions and  valuations.  The  use  of third  party 
information, as is being developed in South Asia, might be another area where loopholes and incentives 
for informality might be “closed.” 
Asymmetric arangements are needed for large metropolitan areas, such as in the case of Mexico 
City  or  Bogotá,  Beijing  or  Shanghai,  which  operate as states/provinces, as  wel as local  governments. 
These are  often the  main engines  of  growth, and the  proper institutional structures and incentives are 
needed to achieve the most eficient outcomes. 
Creating  own-source revenue  handles is a first step.  Ensuring that states and local  governments 
have the incentives to use them depends on the design of the transfer system. If transfers are designed to 
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V. Expenditure management and accountability 
The  main issue from the  perspective  of implementing appropriate institutions for the  management  of 
public funds is to ensure that there are incentives to  make local  governments accountable to local 
electorates.  Also, there should  be responsibility for funds received from the center/supranational 
agencies and donors; and the use of credit should be managed in a transparent and sustainable manner. 
This involves  more than a  mere transplant  of  organizational structures from  developed countries,  but 
also to ensure that these are  used efectively.  Thus, the  process is  much  broader than a ticking  of  of 
boxes in a  PEFA  matrix,  much emphasized  by the  Breton-Woods Institutions,  but addressing the 
incentives for and ability to “play games.” 
It is clear that poor information flows reduce local accountability, negate  yardstick competition, 
and also facilitate game-play vis a vis the central or supranational/ international agencies. The game-play 
has  been clearly  highlighted in the case  of the  EU and incentives for autonomous agencies as  wel as 
regional and local  governments to “hide” information  or “kick the can  down the road.”  Limited 
information flows also facilitate rent-seeking and diversion of resources. 
Relatively few countries in  Latin  America  or  Asia  utilize, for  both the central as  wel as the 
subnational  governments, the ful format  of the IMF’s  Government Financial  Statistics  Manual  2001 
(GFSM2001), which is  designed to ensure conformity  of the financial information  with the  System  of 
National  Accounts.8 Multiple formats in  Mexico at the  Federal level and across the states  make it 
dificult to  generate standardized information for  general  government.  This  makes it  problematic to 
ensure comparability across subnational entities  or engender accountable competition across states. 
Brazilian states,  while  not conforming to the  GFSM2001,  perform  beter than  Mexico in that the 
Federation requires a standardized format to receive, report and report on Federal resources as wel as 
their own resources. 
Without a complete a complete and standardized format to categorize the cycle of revenues and 
expenses; in conjunction  with a tracking  of the cash flows; the likelihood  of “game-play”  by  various 
                            
8 A  number  of countries  use transition  matrices for the reporting  of central  or  general  government information to the IMF in the 
GFSM2001 format.  Pakistan for example reports  data  only for the  budgetary central  government in the latest issue  of the  GFS 
Manual. This is inadequate, as much of the social spending takes place at the subnational level. 
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levels of government or government agencies cannot be ruled out. A typical problem is the inconsistent 
treatment  of  budget coverage with the frequent exclusion  of spending  of  government agencies  or 
liabilities parked in public enterprises. 
In the very simple example of diagram 2, the cash transactions of a government are shown as set 
C. This is a subset of F, which also includes financial assets and liabilities. In turn, F can be denoted as 
a sub-set  of  R,  which also includes al curently assets and liabilities. It is relatively simple for 
governments to reduce  deficits in cash (C)  or financial assets (F),  without afecting al recognized 
liabilities (R) or extended net worth based on future flows (E). For instance, (sub-national or national) 
governments could engage in game-play, by: 
• Seling non-financial assets in R, for cash in F; 
• Assuming future pension liabilities in E, for cash and financial assets in F; 
• Securitization C of future revenue streams F (common in Latin American local governments; 
• Treating borowing F as revenue C (several US States). 
 
DIAGRAM 2 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ALL FUTURE CASH FLOWS (E) 
 
Source: Ahmad (forthcoming). 
 
The sets  C,  F and  R are consistent  with the IMF  GFSM2001.  These represent  nested sets  of 
information, and if  presented in  paralel  with  E,  virtualy removes the scope for  game-play  by 
governments at any level.  
Standardized information is critical for any serious implementation  of fiscal rules in  multi-level 
countries/curency  unions.  This should  be  based  on the consistent and systematic  generation  of 
information in the overlapping manner described above. 
There is a growing popularity of performance budgeting at the center (in both Latin American and 
Asian countries, including Mexico and Pakistan), as wel as participatory budgeting at the local levels. 
Often  bilateral  donors, seeking to improve  budgetary  outcomes,  drive this tendency. It is clear that 
focusing on outcomes is a useful addition to a regular budget process, but does not eliminate the need for 
a consistent, standardized and timely flow of information, so that electorates and policy makers are able 
to judge the true costs of their policy choices. 
The importance of the GFSM2001 cannot be over-stressed, not for reporting to the IMF, but for 
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This has implications for the assistance that could be provided by CEPAL, the IADB and the BWIs to 
member countries  —stressing the importance  of a consistent chart-of-accounts for each subnational 
government consistent  with  GFSM2001.  This  wil involve changes to the  GFMISs at the  national and 
subnational level  being implemented in countries like  Peru,  Bolivia and Indonesia.  This also  has 
implications for Brazil, as it seeks to upgrade its very successful SIAFI dating from the 1990s; and for 
countries in the EU (such as Portugal and Spain) as they struggle to get to grips with the discovery of 
liabilities in the extended public sector as wel as at the regional and subnational levels. 
A.  PPPs: kicking the can down the road? 
PPPs  have  been encouraged, including  by international finance agencies, as a  means  of leveraging 
“private sector” expertise for  public investment  project, and also  bypassing  bureaucratic  botlenecks. 
This is  believed to  generate eficiencies, and improved  value for  money, especialy at the subnational 
level. The expectation is that this wil generate additional growth through the eficiencies and additional 
private finances that would be utilized. 
The problem is that governments, especialy although not exclusively at the subnational level; see 
PPPs as a means of circumventing budget constraints. This could generate legal obfuscations, and relevant 
oficial agencies  or  governments are either  not fuly aware  of the liabilities,  or the ability  of the  private 
partner to meet them. Sometimes, the issue of liability for ful costs is avoided, often with respect to public 
infrastructure (highways and  hospitals in  Europe); and local  governments  only include the annual 
contractual cash  payment  on the  budget, and  generaly  only  during the tenure  of the concerned local 
government.  Often, there is  no  provisioning for the eventual reversion  of the assets to the  public sector. 
Further, there is usualy a continuation of public interventions with respect to prices or distribution.  
There is also incomplete and asymmetric information, with costs and eforts for projects generaly 
known  only to the  private  partner, and significant incentives for either the  private contractor  or the 
government to renege (Danau and  Vinela,  2012).  An example  of a  growing recognition  of limited 
commitment comes from the  UK (which  was in the forefront  of the  PPP revolution). In the  2002-3 
upgrading of the London Underground, Metronet the contracting consortium could not borow the ful 
amount of funds needed for the project. Consequently, Transport for London, the decentralized agency 
responsible  guaranteed  95%  of  Metronet’s  debt  obligations.  Metronet failed, and the  UK  Government 
(Department of Transport) had to pay Transport for London a sum of £ 1.7 bilion to enable it to meet 
the guarantee (House of Lords, 2010). The direct cost to taxpayers was estimated to be as high as £410 
milion. Other examples from the UK, e.g., for wind farm projects, show that in these cases the private 
contribution  was financed  by complex financial instruments that are tantamount to  debt that  has 
eventualy to be taken over by the state. 
As a result of the dificulties above, the International Accounting Standards Board (2011) has issued 
a  new set  of  guidelines (IPSAS  32)9 that force an  upfront accounting for  PPPs, and  would significantly 
afect  deficits and recognition  of liabilities for  general  government (i.e., for  both central and sub-central 
governments and related agencies). This ensures that the  operator is efectively compensated for services 
rendered during the period of the concession period. It requires the government or granting public agency 
to recognize assets and liabilities in their financial statements, when the folowing are met: 
• The  government  or  granting  public agency controls  or regulates the services to  be provided, 
the target beneficiaries or the price; and 
• If the  grantor controls through  ownership,  beneficial entitlement  or  otherwise, a significant 
residual interest in the asset at the end of the arangement. 
In the schema  of diagram 2, this  would involve elements in the areas  R and  E.  This avoids the 
situation where neither the public or private partner recognizes the asset/liability at the end of the period. 
Of course, as has been seen in Ireland and Spain recently (and with Mexican road in the early 1990s), even 
                            
9 See IASB (2011), IPSAS 32. This standard is also likely to afect the guidelines of Eurostat that are not so tightly defined. 
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if there are no explicit guarantees by the federal or state governments and there is suficient pressure on the 
banking system, it is likely that the state wil assume a significant portion of the liabilities.  
The implications are that (1) the annual budgets for each level of government  must be cast in a 
medium-term framework; (2) it is essential to  undertake a ful and careful evaluation  of assets and 
liabilities and associated accounting and reporting of risks with a suficiently long time horizon (using 
international standards, such as the GFSM2001); and (3) it is always important to be able to track the 
cash, and the design of national and subnational TSAs becomes critical. 
B. Folowing the cash: TSAs and transparency 
One  of the  most important common features  of  budget systems across the  world,  whether  of the 
“traditional” line item  variety (as in  most  developing countries and  Germany),  or  of the  more  modern 
flexible systems, that rely  on spending agency accountability (as in  Scandinavia), is a treasury single 
account (TSA).  This institutional feature  has  been recommended  by the IMF in a large  number  of 
countries as part of its Technical Assistance and Capacity Development. Despite some successes, as in 
PR  China, establishing a  TSA  has  proved elusive in countries from  Mexico (the  only  OECD country 
without a TSA) to Pakistan. 
The  dificulty in establishing a  TSA lies  primarily in  vested interests,  both  political as  wel as 
bureaucratic (for  details, see  Ahmad, forthcoming).  Often at the  national level, there is spending  by 
security agencies, donors, and other political centers of power. The key question is whether these can be 
included within the TSA?  
The same issues arise with respect to sub-national entities. Should local governments have their 
own TSAs? Should they use a central TSA? What are the problems posed by donors, both multilateral 
(such as the World Bank) or bilateral agencies that may not trust the local governments to use their funds 
eficiently or without significant leakages? 
Some countries do not have suficiently large subnational entities for it to be eficient to establish 
local TSAs.10 In some cases, the IMF has recommended that the local governments use the central TSA. 
While this  may  be  desirable in  principle, the  practice can  be a severe  problem.  Suddenly, local 
governments face a closure  of their  bank accounts, and  do  not  know  where the  money  goes and their 
balances. And in order to issue payment orders, they have to send emissaries to the central Ministry of 
Finance and  petition the  Treasury to release funds.  This adds to the complexity  of the local  budget 
process and could endanger the decentralization process. 
What are the problems with donors —seen e.g., in a range of countries? The insistence to keep 
separate bank accounts for their spending poses the risk of paralel budget processes, and makes it hard 
for either local  or central  governments to  get a  grip  on total spending. Besides  obfuscating the  budget 
process, it reduces the accountability for achieving results. 
A solution is shown in diagram  3 with a  modification  of the  TSA  principle  often  used for 
“independent” bodies, including security agencies —the principle of establishing corespondent accounts 
(CA) within a TSA. Thus CA1 would be the account of local government 1; and CA2 that for a bilateral 
agency, say the  GIZ that  might  want to  keep its  operations separate,  or even a security agency at the 
national level. 
If there is a  GFMIS, then the  operations  of the  CA  become the responsibility  of the local 
government  or the  bilateral/security agency.  They could issue  payment  orders to the extent  of their 
resources in each account. Without a GFMIS, it may be necessary to establish a series of zero-balance 
accounts in commercial  banks, again subject to the resources in the respective accounts.  This cuts 
through the bureaucracy, and yet al levels of government have ful information on who spends what and 
                            
10 The Chinese provinces are larger than most countries and have their own TSAs, nested and linked with the Central TSA in Beijing. 
This is a  very interesting  model and could  usefuly  be examined in the larger  multi-level countries  —e.g.,  other  members  of the 
BRICS and countries of similar size, such as Indonesia or Pakistan. 
ECLAC – Macroeconomics of Development Series N° 139 Generating inclusive and sustainable growth… 
23 
when. Thus, both cash management (best managed at the central level in most cases), and information 
flows are facilitated. 
This smal example ilustrates that often the first best may makes maters worse, if implemented 
without thinking in inappropriate conditions. It is often necessary to work through why there is no TSA 
in a particular context, and then try and address the issues on a case-by-case basis. This involves work to 
understand the political economy constraints in each case. 
 
DIAGRAM 3 
TSA WITH DONORS/LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
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VI. Incentive structures and design and 
management of transfer systems 
Al the carefuly designed and implemented incentive structures described above could be negated if a 
transfer system  were to cover al  deficits and  debts  without any constraints.  The creation  of a level 
playing field through a system  of equalization transfers is critical; this should enable al subnational 
governments to provide similar levels of services at similar levels of tax efort.  
However, for investment needs and infrastructure gaps to maximize the growth potential, it would 
be  useful to  begin to create the  preconditions for  performance-based transfers.  This  would ensure that 
the investments  produce results and are  managed eficiently.  Such transfers could also  be  used to 
promote central  government  objectives, such as social  protection for the  marginalized and  most 
vulnerable.  However, care  needs to  be taken should the transfers  be implemented in areas  of local 
government jurisdiction, as this could lead to a diversion of resources and additional “game play.” 
A. Earmarked transfers 
Many countries try to achieve central  government  objectives in an increasingly  decentralized context 
through a system of earmarked transfers. The biggest drawback of excessive earmarking is that it overides 
local preferences, and is inimical to the basic philosophy underlying the decentralized processes —i.e., to 
generate accountability for local responsibilities. Moreover, a big constraint faced by countries with weak 
PFM systems, and poor information on who spends what, is that it is hard to ensure that the funds are not 
diverted to other heads that may be more important for local oficials; or just stolen. 
As described in Ahmad (2009), it may be possible to ofset some of the PFM disadvantages by 
inducing competition among recipient jurisdictions, using simple performance criteria. The basic idea is 
that a  medium-term  budget framework is  put in  place, and the transfers in  period t+2 are  made 
conditional on achieving targets set for period t+1.  
Thus, if  growth and employment  generation is an  objective, and is  not achieved  by additional 
transfers  given to the  metropolitan areas, it  may  be  useful to reconsider the strategy in the coming 
period. Also the relationships between the metropolitan administration and the decentralized subordinate 
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municipalities would clearly need to be clarified. Eventualy, when the PFM systems are strong enough, 
and the court systems function eficiently, one could consider “contract” based transfers (Spahn, 2006). 
B. Equalization transfers 
1.  Design 
Under a modern system of “equalization” the objective could be to “assign transfers so that subnational 
governments could provide equal standards of service at equal levels of tax efort”. This is the modern 
mechanism that  has  been  used across  States in  Australia,  provinces in  China, and  municipalities and 
districts in  Denmark,  Hungary.  A  more restricted arangement  based  on equalizing revenue capacities 
only is used in Canada, but a replication of this to other countries assume that local governments have 
some control over local revenue bases (either through control over rates or through elements involved in 
the tax administration. 
Very simply, the equalization framework would be based on “standardized” factors. This ensures 
that local governments would not be able to influence the magnitude of the transfer by their actions or 
lack of actions (see Ahmad and Searle, 2006, for a description of alternative models). 
The standardized transfers thus become more or less “lump sum” and do not distort incentives at 
the local level. The standardized spending responsibilities would address diferential costs of provision 
for services assigned to them,  with  higher costs in remotely  populated areas, as  wel as  densely 
populated urban districts. Similarly, the own-revenue potential would be based on standardized revenue 
(spatial distribution of bases, assuming average rates), and the fact that a local government chooses not 
to exploit a revenue base would not lead to a higher grant. Thus, there would be an incentive to beter 
utilize assigned revenue bases. 
The equalization framework in Indonesia started out in 2001 on the basis of standardized factors, 
but these  were changed into actual spending and transfers converting it into an estimate  of the actual 
gap.  This completely changed the incentive structure, as the  deficit came  under the control  of local 
governments and  generated a trend towards ineficient expansion of spending, especialy  on  personnel 
and benefits. 
It is important to avoid complexity in the  design  of equalization frameworks.  The  Australian 
model has been criticized as being so complicated that it becomes hard to judge the economic outcomes 
and implications.  There  has  been a conscious atempt in the  Commonwealth  Grants  Commission to 
simplify  models and factors  used to estimate  disabilities.  The  Chinese application  of the  Australian 
equalization framework also used very simple factors, such as population. Clearly, population, which is 
also used as the basis for simple transfers (which makes it a very political variable), is stil important as a 
factor for equalization. But using it in a standardized manner to evaluate relative costs or needs difuses 
the  perceived concerns  with the  population  variable.  Simplified  versions could  be  used at  municipal 
level; with a few criteria. 
Overal, a modern equalization framework should shift the focus from “entitlements” to a political 
focus  on service  delivery  by local  governments.  This  helps  with local  oversight and could  help also 
generate “yardstick competition”. In the folowing, some common formulations for  general-purpose 
transfers are discussed. 
2.  Formula-based general purpose transfers 
There are five types of formulas curently used around the world for general transfers.  
a) Transfers based on equal per capita alocations 
This is the simplest system for alocation of grants requiring only information on population. It is used in 
a  number  of countries, such as  Germany for the alocation  of a share  of  VAT and  Canada for the 
alocation  of the  block  grant for  health and social services. It assumes that  population is a suitable 
indicator of local expenditure needs. It also has minimal equity content since it gives the same per capita 
amount to poor and rich areas, although it does not consider revenues. 
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The formula would be as folows: 
TRi = (Pi/P) x TR 
where TR is the transfer; P is population; i stands for local unit i. Variables without i refer to the country 
total. 
Countries at an early stage in their intergovernmental arangements, such as Cameroon, have used 
this formulation.  While the  population figures are relatively robust in  principle,  once the transfers are 
linked to this factor, there is  hesitancy in  updating the figures so that there is  not  much  of a shift in 
resource alocation  paterns.  The figure  has thus become “politicized.”  Moreover,  by  definition,  more 
resources flow to where the population density is greatest and these tend to be the richest areas with the 
best facilities.  This  potentialy introduces a  bias against the less  wel to  do areas,  or  where there are 
higher costs of provision of services (typicaly the poorer areas). 
b) Formulae based on general indicators of expenditure needs 
These formulae are very popular and derive from the previous one by adding other indicators of needs 
such as  poverty incidence, area,  population  density, infant  mortality, and (inverse)  of  GDP.  The 
indicators are  not related to  distinct expenditure responsibilities assigned to local  governments,  but to 
their total expenditure. 
An ilustration  of a simple formula folows, with three equaly  weighted indicators:  geographic 
area and the number of poor persons, in addition to population: 
TRi = Pi/P x 1/3 TR + Povi/Pov x 1/3 TR + Ai/A x 1/3 TR, 
where in addition to previous symbols Pov is the number of poor persons and A is area (km2). 
The dificulty with this formulation is that it is hard to link the factors with reasons for spending 
or transfers. Indeed, perverse incentives can be created, such as the need to maximize the number of poor 
in order to atract the highest amount of transfers. This could encourage poor decision-making. 
c) Formulae based on specific indicators of expenditure needs 
These formulae are more complex since they use distinct indicators of need for each local expenditure 
responsibility.  They represent a considerable improvement  over the  previous system  but require  more 
information and  may  be subject to  obfuscation if  not  managed in a transparent  way.  An example is 
provided by South Africa, where the general purpose transfer to the provinces is alocated according to a 
system that has six components: (i) an education component, representing 51 percent of the total transfer 
alocated according to  population in school age and to school enrolment; (i) a  health component, 
representing 26 percent of the total transfer alocated according to population with and without medical 
aid; (ii) a  basic component, representing  14  percent  of the total transfer alocated according to 
population; (iv) a poverty component, representing 3 percent of the total transfer alocated according to 
the  number  of  poor  persons (quintiles  1 and  2); (v) an economic activity component, representing  1 
percent  of the total transfer alocated according to  GDP; and (vi) an institutional component, 
representing the remaining 5 percent equaly distributed as a lump sum among provinces. 
The formula for the education component would be the folowing: 
ETRi = SAPi/SAP x 0.5 ETR + Eni/En x 0.5 ETR where, in addition to previous symbols, ETR is the education component of the transfer; SAP is school-
age population; and En is the  number  of  pupils enroled in schools.  Similar formulas  would apply to 
other expenditure functions. 
One  has to  be careful  with the  use  of spending information for  various functions. If actual 
numbers are  used, these are  generaly under the control  of the subnational  governments.  Thus,  higher 
spending  would atract  higher transfers, and the  disincentive efects are  obvious, as in the Indonesian 
case. A general principle is to avoid using factors under the direct control of subnational governments. 
This  would  minimize the incentives for “game-play” that are inherent in this class  of formulae and 
transfer design. 
  
ECLAC – Macroeconomics of Development Series N° 139 Generating inclusive and sustainable growth… 
28 
d) Formulae based only on fiscal capacity 
In this case, the transfer  does  not take account  of expenditure  needs,  but  only  diferences in fiscal 
capacity. An example is provided by the Canadian system of general-purpose transfers to provinces that 
consider only differences in tax capacity and assume, corespondingly, that each province has the same 
per capita expenditure needs. It has to be noted that the Canadian provinces are very large in terms of 
area,  which reduces the  variance in average expenditure  needs.  Furthermore, the  general-purpose 
transfers to provinces are supplemented with specific transfers that consider needs. 
The formula based on revenue capacity would be as folows: 
TRi= t x (B/P – Bi/Pi) x Pi 
where, in addition to the previous symbols, B is the efective tax base (not the assessed tax base, but the 
base that potentialy can be assessed; and t is the average efective tax rate on the concerned tax base). 
Since B/P – Bi/Pi  measures the diference between the per capita national average tax base and that of region i, the formula brings the fiscal capacity of those sub-national governments that are below 
the national average up to the national average, i.e., it provides 100 percent equalization with reference 
to the national average. Equalization can obviously be less intense. 
Note that the use of the potential rather than actual addresses the problem of incentives. If actual 
revenues are  used for the calculation  of transfers, it  would induce subnational  governments to reduce 
their tax efort. 
e) Formulae that consider both expenditure needs and fiscal capacity 
These formulas are a combination of the third and fourth formulas. Expenditure needs are estimated for 
each local expenditure responsibility and aggregated; and linked to the revenue capacity components. 
Thus, the transfer wil result from the diference between total expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, as 
in the folowing formula: 
TRi =ΣNij – FCi 
where, in addition to  previous symbols, N is expenditure  need; FC is fiscal capacity; and j stands for 
expenditure responsibility. 
Such formulae are used in an increasing number of countries such as Australia, Denmark, Japan, 
Korea, and the  United  Kingdom.  They can  be complex and require a considerable amount  of 
information, thus requiring considerable length of time for their complete implementation.  
If they become too complex, they could sufer in terms  of clarity and  neutrality in terms  of 
incentives. However, if properly built and implemented, they can be both eficient and equitable. 
3. Management of transfers: a new Grants Commission 
The options to implement an equalization grants system vary from the establishment of an independent 
Grants’ Commission to entrusting the function to the Ministry of Finance or other line agency, such as 
the  Ministry  of  Home  Afairs  or  Local  Governments,  or  both  Ministries (as in Indonesia).  Table  3 
presents some international experiences. 
An independent Grants’ Commission could be established to determine the relativities for making 
equalization transfers, in coordination with the local governments. It does not make payments directly, 
which are routed through the  Treasury,  but establishes the  basis and  monitors and colects the 
information needed to make the system work. In countries such as Australia, the Grants Commission is 
an independent agency with representation by the subnational governments. 
In countries such as  Mexico  or  China, the  Ministry  of  Finance  manages the intergovernmental 
grants function. Often there is a separate section within the Treasury/MOF to administer this function. 
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Source: Searle 2010 in Ahmad and Al Faris, Fiscal Reforms in the GCC, Edward Elgar. 
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4. Performance-based transfers 
There is an expectation that results-based intergovernmental transfers could lead to  positive 
infrastructure and service-delivery  outcomes,  with improved alocative eficiency,  beter 
implementation, and lower costs.11 Such  grants  have  been increasingly stressed  by the international 
agencies, including the ADB and the World Bank. 
Performance-based transfers have to be carefuly designed and managed, especialy if implemented 
in the sphere  of subnational  government competence. If inadequate atention is  paid to the factors that 
could be atributed to local government actions, such transfers could lead to a diversion of own-resources to 
less productive activities, and also reduce accountability. The cycle from objectives to outcomes has to be 
carefuly specified, and exogenous factors need to be taken into account (see diagram 4). 
The technical eficiency  process is the regular  budget  process that links the alocation  of funds 
through to the funds actualy spent, as wel as outcomes. These would be normaly tracked through with 
the  help  of a  GFMIS,  preferably  on a standardized  basis for al subnational and central/federal 
governments.  The IADB  has assisted a  number  of  Latin  American countries, including  Bolivia,  with 
such subnational  GFMISs, although  with insuficient atention to the  Chart  of  Accounts and tracking 
spending on a GFSM2001 compatible basis. In addition a linkage has to be made between the outcomes 
and the service objectives, and there is a degree of subjectivity in determining the exogenous factors that 
might have played a part. 
If the performance-based transfers are based on complex input criteria, or detailed standards that 
cannot  be  monitored  or enforced, the conditionality  becomes irelevant.  Similarly, a focus  on  outputs 
rather than  outcomes  may lead to  unintended  or  perverse incentives. Nonetheless, even in situations 
where information  on  budget spending is  partial  or subject to  delays,  physical  outcomes  may  be 
relatively simple to identify  quickly and accurately; this could  be  particularly  useful for infrastructure 
projects. These could be measured and additional funding in future rounds could be made conditional on 
these outcome indicators (Ahmad and Martinez, 2010). Care has to be taken to ensure that the positive 
incentives from a  performance-based system are  not  negated  by  other  badly  designed transfers, for 
instance based on gap-filing or other distortive criteria. 
 
DIAGRAM 4 
PERFORMANCE BASED GRANTS: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: Ahmad (forthcoming). 
                            
11 UNCDF, 2010, “Performance-based Grant Systems: Concept and International Experience.”  
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A  performance-based system should supplement local  government actions and responsibility, 
such as through meeting infrastructure gaps that are hard for local governments to address, and which 
can be easily monitored. In the longer run, more efective and standardized PFM systems are essential 
for information flows to improve eficiency and accountability. Similarly, incentive structures depend on 
whether or not sub-national entities have access to own-source revenues and are subject to hard budget 
constraints. While, this mutual interdependency wil take many years to work through, countries such as 
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